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The Court qualified its conclusion by
stating: "we need not rule out the possibility of showing the kind of threat to fair
trial rights that would possess the requisite degree of certainty to justify restraint. Id.at 2808.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Stewart and Marshall, concurred in the
Chief Justice's judgment, but stated he
would hold that with respect to criminal
proceedings in particular, prior restraints
on freedom of the press are not permis-

sible under the Constitution. "Discussion of public affairs in a free society
cannot depend on the preliminary grace
of judicial censors." Id. at 2809. Justices
White and Stevens, in concurrences,
implied agreement to Justice Brennan's
position. However, the holding as delivered by the Chief Justice was somewhat limited to the facts of the case:
"We hold that, with respect to the order
entered in this case prohibiting reporting
or commentary on judicial proceedings

held in public, the barriers have not been
overcome; to the extent that this order
restrained publication of such material, it
is clearly invalid. To the extent that it
prohibited publication based on information gained from other sources, we
conclude that the heavy burden imposed as a condition to securing a prior
restraint was not met and the judgment
of the Nebraska Supreme Court is therefore reversed." Id. at 2808.

Recent Maryland Decisions
by Jerry Fenzel

Federal Government Lacks
Standing to Enjoin Maryland
Health Officials' Practices Absent National Emergency.
In a case filed on July 8, 1976 in the
U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland, the Attorney General of the
United States brought suit on behalf of
the United States to enjoin certain Maryland health officials' practices and
policies which allegedly deprive mentally retarded residents of Rosewood
State Hospital of their constitutional
rights under the Eighth, Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. United States v. Solomon, 45
U.S.L.W. 2039, (U.S. July 8, 1976)
The defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Attorney
General had no authority or standing to
bring this action. Chief Judge Edward S.
Northrup granted the defendants' Motion to Dismiss stating that the executive
branch of the government does not extend to bringing such a suit absent a
showing by the United States of a situation of national emergency.
In a lengthy opinion, Judge Northrup
presented the plaintiffs' contentions
from constitutional, statutory, and
common law standpoints, but in each instance emphatically concluded that the
government lacked standing. The court
did not express an opinion on the merits
of the underlying issue regarding the
care and treatment of the mentally re-

the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on
September 8, 1976.

Maryland's Mechanic's Lien
Law Upheld-Or Was It?

tarded in Maryland. The conclusion
simply means that lawsuits aimed at protecting these individuals' rights must be
brought by the proper plaintiffs.
This case brought considerable attention from other states. Texas and
Pennsylvania filed amicus curiae briefs
in support of the defendants' position.
The government appealed Judge Northrup's decision, arguing its case before

Maryland's two hundred-year-old
mechanic's lien statute came within
inches of being declared void by the
Maryland Court of Appeals in Barry
Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing
Co., 277 Md. 15, 353 A.2d 222 (1976).
Barry v. Fick was the first known case in
Maryland which dealt with the constitutionality of the mechanic's lien law and
the applicability thereto of the due process clauses of Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Fick Brothers Roofing Company
(Fick) filed a bill of complaint to enforce a
mechanic's lien against the property of
Barry Properties, Inc. (Barry). Fick complied with the applicable Maryland statutes and the Maryland Rules of Procedure in filing, and the lower court rendered a decision in its favor, from which
Barry appealed on the ground that the
Maryland mechanic's lien law deprives
the owner of property without procedural due process. The law authorizes
the lien to be imposed without notice or
an opportunity for a prior hearing.
The appellant's case emanated from,
and is analogous to, four recent Su-

preme Court decisions, each of which
addresses the question of whether certain statutory prejudgment creditor remedies are consonant with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court in its majority opinion
by Judge Eldridge, attempted to review
Barry v. Fick in light of these recent decisions, but somehow arrived at a different
conclusion.
The court held that for the mechanic's
lien statute to meet the requirements of
due process, two prerequisites must
exist: (1) there must be state action,
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1974), and (2)
the imposition of the lien under the
Maryland statute must constitute a significant taking of property.
In response to the first prerequisite,
the court reasoned that since the liens
are created, regulated, and enforced by
the State, then they are considered state
action. The second prerequisite was met
by the rationale that even though the
property owner still had possession, he
did not have unfettered tide, as in this
case, where the appellant was unable to
obtain the balance on its construction
loan. Since both of the prerequisites
were met, the court concluded that the
mechanic's lien law is incompatible with
both Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The final issue to be decided was
whether, considering the unconstitutionality of the lien law, all or part of the
statute should be abrogated. In deciding
this issue the court looked to the legislative intent of the General Assembly in
enacting the mechanic's lien statutes.
The intent was to insure, by means of a
mechanic's lien, that the persons who
have contributed labor or materials to a
construction project would be compensated for their contributions. Applying
the legislative intent to the facts, the
court decided that notwithstanding the
unconstitutionality of the statute, the appellant was afforded due process in that
Barry had been provided with notice of
the hearing.
Judge Levine agreed with the majority's reasoning, but strongly disagreed
with the result. He could not imagine

how a statute rendered facially unconstitutional and violative of the Fourteenth Amendment could be constitutional in its application to a given case.
Even though Barry v. Fick did not
conclusively abrogate Maryland's
mechanic's lien law, the court placed it in
a tenuous position, leaving the law subject to immediate review by the General
Assembly.

Further Application of
Mullaney v. Wilbur
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals, in two recent decisions, expanded
the State's burden of proof requirement
in a trial for murder, but arrived at different conclusions in respect to the trial
judge's failure to instruct the jury that the
burden of negating mitigation in a murder charge was on the State.
In Garland v. State, 29 Md. App. 27,
349 A.2d 374 (1975), the defendant
was convicted by a jury of second degree
murder, During the trial, the defendant
contended that he killed his victim in a
"hot-blooded response to a legally
adequate provocation in the course of
mutual combat." Evidence produced by
the defendant and the State was enough
to generate a jury issue on the subject of
mitigation due to provocation, which, if
found, would reduce the crime from
second degree murder to manslaughter,
The court followed Evans v. State. 28
Md. App. 640, 349 A.2d 300 (1975),
which placed the burden on the State to
prove the absence of a defensive issue
once the issue, such as mitigation, has
been fairly generated by the evidence.
Since the defendant raised the issue of
mitigation, the onus was on the State to
negate the defensive issue and the responsibility was on the trial judge to instruct the jury that the State had the burden; if the jurors were not persuaded by
the State beyond a reasonable doubt,
the verdict would be manslaughter. The
court held that the trial judge failed to
properly instruct the jury. His incomplete
instructions did not pass the constitutional muster recently set forth by the

Supreme Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur,
421 U.S. 684 (1975)
Conversely, in Dorsey & Wilson u'
State, 29 Md. App 97, 349 A.2d 414
(1975), the court decided that the failure
of the trial judge to instruct the jury of the
State's burden to negate mitigation was
harmless error and would not upset the
conviction of first degree murder.
The facts which differentiated Dorsey
and Garland, producing different result.
were as follows: The defendants in Dorsey were accused of first degree murder
and the defense did not raise the issue of
mitigation. On the other hand, in Garland the defendant was convicted of
murder in the second degree and the defense had raised the issue of mitigation.
The court held that the State need not
negate mitigation and that the trial judge
need not instruct the jury accordingly, if
the jury convicts the defendant of first
degree murder. By rendering a first degree murder conviction, the jury decided
that there was premeditation on the part
of the defendant, with the presumption
of malice, thus relieving the State of its
burden of proving a lack of mitigation. In
Garland. however, the verdict of second
degree murder did not include the
malice presumption, since evidence of
mitigation was introduced by the defense and was not negated by the State.

Right to a Jury Trial at the Circuit Court Level
In Thompson v. State, 278 Md. 41.
359 A.2d 203 (1976), the defendant
prayed a jury trial for adjudication of
charges of driving while intoxicated, driving while impaired, and spinning wheels.
When the case came before the Circuit
Court, the Assistant State's Attorney entered a nolle prosequi on the driving
while intoxicated charge, The State then
contended that the remaining charges
were petty and as such, the defendant
was not entitled to a jury trial. Further,
the State alleged that the case should be
returned to the District Court. The Court
of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit
Court's decision in denying a jury trial.
Thompson v. State, 26 Md. App. 442,
338 A.2d 411 (1975). After granting cer-

the rule it may do so, but until then the
Thompson case applies.
In Howard v. State, 32 Md. App. 75,
A2d 568 (1976), the defendant was
charged with disturbing the peace, assault, and obstructing a police officer.
The defendant was to be tried in District
Court, which had concurrent jurisdiction
with the Circuit Court. However, the defendant prayed a jury trial under the
provisions of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art.
§4-302 (d)(2). The issue was whether
the demand for a juy trial on the latter
two offenses also deprived the District
Court of its original exclusive jurisdiction

tiorari to determine Thompson's right to
a jury trial or whether the charges should
have been returned for trial in the District
Court, the Court of Appeals held that the
District Court rule, relied on by the lower
court, which prevents a defendant from
praying a jury trial on petty offenses, no
longer applies when a case gets to the
Circuit Court.
Rule 741 of the Maryland Rules of
Procedure is applicable in Circuit Court,
where all defendants, without exception
as to petty offenses, are entitled to a trial
by jury. The Court further stated that if
the General Assembly wants to qualify
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Drugs:
Recent
Decisions
by Peter H. Meyers

(Reprinted, with permission,from The Leaflet, A publication of the National Organization for the Reform of MarijuanaLaws)
U.S. SUPREME COURT
LIMITS
ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
How much help can police agents give in
the commission of a crime and still be
able to prosecute successfully afterwards? That question recently split the
U.S. Supreme Court three ways in a
case that has narrowly defined the limits
of entrapment and other related defenses.
The case, Hampton v. United States,
44 U.S.L.W. 4542 (April 27, 1976), involved an undercover DEA agent who
had supplied Hampton with heroin and
then arranged for him to sell it to other
DEA agents. After Hampton made two
sales, he was arrested and convicted for
distributing heroin.
A five-Justice majority of the Supreme
Court, in affirming Hampton's conviction, limits the defense of entrapment to

over the petty offense, i.e., disturbing the
peace.
Under the Thompson ruling, the
Court of Special Appeals decided that
the trial court in Howard erred by severing the petty charges from the other two
charges for which a jury trial was prayed.
The court stated that the Circuit Court
properly acquired jurisdiction over all
the offenses with which the defendant
was charged and that the defendant was
entitled to a jury trial on all charges, including the petty charges when joined
originally with charges falling under C.J.
§4-302.

situations where government agents
"implant" the criminal design in the
mind of an innocent person. Entrapment
cannot be claimed when government
agents encourage or act in concert with
an individual who was "predisposed" to
commit an offense, as Hampton's attorney had conceded he was.
However, entrapment is not the only
defense which can be raised when police
participate in the commission of a crime.
Two justices who voted to affirm
Hampton's conviction-Powell and
Blackmun-indicated in a separate opinion that they would bar the prosecution
of a "predisposed" defendant when
"police overinvolvement in the crime
[reached] a demonstrable level of outrageousness," based upon due process
principles or the Court's supervisory
powers. The three dissenting justicesBrennan, Stewart, and Marshallagreed that outrageous police involvement would bar prosecution, forming a
slender five-justice majority for this principle. The dissenters would have gone
further, and reversed Hampton's conviction in this case because of the police involvement, stating that in their view:
"The Government's role has passed
the point of toleration ...The Government is doing nothing less than buying
contraband from itself through an intermediary and jailing the intermediary."
The other three justices who voted to
affirm
Hampton's
convictionRehnquist, White, and Chief Justice
Burger-indicated in a separate opinion

that they did not recognize any defense
beyond entrapment, and would not bar
the prosecution of a "predisposed" defendant no matter how outrageous the
government's involvement was in the
commission of a crime. Justice Stevens
did not participate.
This decision is binding only on the
federal courts, and not the states. A
number of state courts have adopted
more liberal tests for entrapment.
U.S. SUPREME COURT
REJECTS "FREE EXERCISE
OF RELIGION"
MARIJUANA DEFENSE
The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected
for the second time the defense of members of a large communal group claiming
a right under the Free Exercise of Religion clause of the First Amendment to cultivate marijuana for use in religious practices. In 1971, four members of the
group, including its spiritual leader,
Stephen Gaskin, were arrested and convicted for cultivating marijuana. All four
admitted growing marijuana, but argued
that marijuana was an integral part of the
religious practices at "the farm" a selfsufficient spiritual community of about
800 individuals located in Summertown,
Tennessee.
After these convictions were affirmed
by the Tennessee Supreme Court, the
U.S. Supreme Court summarily dismissed an appeal "for want of a substantial
federal question" in 1973, Gaskin v.
Tennessee, 414 U.S. 886. The four indi-

